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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah·
STATE OF UTAH,
PI,Iintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 7286

vs.
JOSEPH DEAN PETERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's brief contains a statement of facts and therefore respondent refrains from making any independent presentation of the circumstances except in instances where
respondent will refer to certain facts in presenting evidence
and testimony which appellant failed to bring out in his brief.
Appellant assigned 3 3 assignments of error in his brief and
organized his argument to cover said errors under four propositions. With this in mind, counsel for respondent will hereinafter answer such arguments with the same organization of
subject matter.
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

.··
!£1

:-~-;·.:

! (.

ASSERTION NO. 1
...':IJ

,·,·.··

THE EVIDENCE OF THE REVOCATION OF THE
DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED.
Appellant's contention ~s that there was no competent
evidence .introduced at the trial to connect the revocation of
defendant's driver's license with the facts and circumstances
surrounding the death of James Curwood. A careful ·review
of the transcript of the testimony taken at the trial reveals
that there was a definite chain of circumstances which connect
defendant's driving after revocation of his license with the
death of James Curwood. Briefly this testimony includes the
following:
1. Bert Karen at T. 19 testified as· follows concerning
the truck which ran over the deceased James Curwood:

wr

•

A.
ell, 1 see a car light coming down the road, but
I didllt pay 'much attention to that, I just stepped up
far enough so that I would be! nobody would see me,
:you know, as far as. what I was doing, and the cat·
·came down and it pulled over on that side of the road , ·
over there to pass me, when I hea1·d a thud or bump,
and just in split seconds, you know, and by the time
I got my brain to going and thinking a second,, why
I said, rrGod, he has hit or run over som-ething." I
don't know· just exactly what I said but I said somethink like that. ·
J

And I broke and run down the road and he was laying right square in the road. And I leaned right over
him and put my hand on him like that (indicating).
4
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·,.

And I thought I u•as there quite a little bit, but it might
have been just seconds, I don't know for sure, but 1
just leaned over and put my hand on him and I thought
he might gasp or something, but he just-] said, ''God,
he is dead." And I looked ttp and there u·as my brother.
And my brother said, rrDon't touch him. Let's get the
law." And I was scared and dumfounded and I don-'t
know U'hat all, and I looked down the road and the
car was still going. So I broke and ran back to the
pickup. The thought I had was to get to Harry Au
1VI.iller's to the phone and get somebody there that could
do something and know something about it. And that's
exactly what I ~id.

The witness placed this occurrence at about 3:00 o'clock a. m.
(T.96)
2. When asked what kind of a vehicle it was he was testifying about, Bert Karen answered that it was "a truck with a
box on". (T.22)
3. S. D. Hatch, the State Highway Patrolman, who had
received a call from Bert Karen, stated that he was told over the
phone by Mr. Karen "to watch for a large truck coming towards
Vernal."
4. Concerning the first vehicle coming toward Vernal subsequent to this warning, S. D. Hatch testified as follows:
A. The first thing I observed about the car that C"ame_
around the turn was that it had clearance lights and
one weak light; the lefthand light was not -very bright.

Q. Now when you say lefthand light, which one do
you mean, lefthand as you were facing it, or what
would it be?

;
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, :·A. It would be the right hand as I was facing it and
. tf?e lefthand from the re4r of the ,truck.

Q. W ha~ l!ght do you mean?

.Y

..

_, ... ~,·, A. The headlight.

· .• , · · · Q. And you say-you could see what else on the car?
~.-,::;·~·(:-~ ' .

. _L1·.

I could see some clearance lights on the front,
hi.gher, than_ the headlights and a little wider .

. ,._ ~- ·..

Q. Was the truck coming towards you?
_A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then what did you do?

,_.

_A. At about, oh, midway in the fourth block in Vernal
Main street ·on U. S. 40 I turned the red light toward
the approaching truck, jumped out with my flash light
.,and _waved the truck over to the side of the road.

. ....
.:

~,

'.

Q~

Whom did you find, if anyone, in the truck{

A. I found one person only in the truck, the defendant
Joseph Dean Peterson. (T~ 114-115).

>. ,). The state highway patrolman's first cursory examination
ofthe.defendant's truck at this timerevealed that the left front
fender, the left headlight and the left fog light were bent back
a_nd ''kin~ of twisted off to the side.'' (T.121) Of course, there
~ere numerous references to this condition of the truck later on
in the trial together· with photo~raphs of the same which were
introduced and admitted at the trial.
. _ 6. According to Mr. C. P. Allison, Highway Patrolman

f~r .the State of Colorado, the headlights on defendant's truck
we~e normal and- of equal intensity at 11: 30 p.m. in Artesia,
Colorado. (T.3T7)

6
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7. During the course of the conversation between Hatch
and the defendant at the time of the defendant's first arrival in
Vernal, the following took place, according to the testimony of
Mr. Hatch at 128:

A. T be defendcmt, 11--Ir. Peterson, hollered at me and
carne acmss the street to the car, and as I recall, as near
as I recall his u•ords, he asked rne, he said, rrsam, U'dJ
that man killed out there?'' or something to that
e_ffect. To which I told him I didn't know for sure.
He replied, as near as I recall, uHe hadn't better be.
I hope he is not."
8. Concerning a later examination of defendant's truck at

Vernal, in front of the police station, Mr. S. D. Hatch further
testified as follows:
A. I observed on the cross members, frame, fear channel bolts that holds the springs to the rear axel, several
places along from the driver's door, or the cab of the
truck, back to the rear end, marks that had been brushed
clean. There was kind of an oily dustry covering substance under the truck, covered with dust. This had
been wiped clean at different angles along the frame
and some on the cross members, some on the rru··
holts or the channel bolts on the fear. (T. 199).

Thus indicating that the under parts of the truck recently had
come into contact with some object or person.
· 9. During the course of this examination of the truck, Patrolman Hatch discovered a tooth resting on top of the front
axel. (T. 200, 203)
10. This tooth was later that day identified by Dr. Stevens

7
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•as a .tooth from the mouth of the deceased, James Curwood.

-(T.. a44)
The ·above evidence certainly tends to connect the defendant with the driving of the vehicle that struck and ran over
James. Curwood. Though it may be circumstantial evidence, it
is. equally competent with direct evidence. 31 C.J.S. 907. In
prosecutions for manslaughter it has been held that it is not
error to admit in evidence circumstances from which the jury
may 'infer the responsibility of the defendant for the death, and
especially where such circumstances are consistent with the
theory sought to be established by the prosecution. People vs.
Leutholz ( 1929) 102 Cal. App. 493, 283 P. 292; Heatley vs:
State ( 1929) 39 Ga. App. 550, 147 S. E. 784; State vs. Flatman
(1931) 172 La. 620, 135 So. 3.
"
It_ was not until after practically all of the foregoing evidence was in that the State introduced evidence of the revocation
of defendant's driver's license. Therefore, respondent submits
'that competent evidence had been offered and received upon
which the jury could make a finding that the driving of the
truck in question by the defendant had a causal connection with
the injuring of Ja_mes Curwood and his subsequent death.
The principal objection of counsel for appellant, however,
seems to be that there is no causal connection between the fact
that the defendant was driving after having had his license revoked and the death of James Curwood.
The lower court in ruling upon the defendant's objection
to the introduction of evidence of the revocation of defendant's
license, referred to the decision in State of Utah vs. Lingman,
8
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97 Utah 180; 91 Pac. (2d) 457, and the appellant quotes at
length from that opinion. Appellant contends that the lower
court misinterpreted the law as set forth in the Lingman case.
According to that opinion, among the unlawful acts which
might be used as a basis for involuntary manslaughter, which
are totally prohibited, are the driving without a license and the
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
opinion states that if such totally prohibited acts are "done
recklessly or with marked disregard for the safety of others,
they are done with criminal negligence and if death results will
sustain a charge of manslaughter under arm (a)." 97 Utah
p. 200.
Respondent will admit that there are some unlawful acts,
the commission of which would have no causal connection with
an automobile accident resulting in death, such as the driving ot
an automobile by a person who was not supporting his wife and
family or such as the carrying of concealed weapons, or the
driving of an automobile without registration plates. However,
one case has gone so far as to say that the carrying of liquor
unlawfully was an act which approximately caused the death of
the deceased in a manslaughter case. This is People vs. Harris,
( 1921) 214 Mich. 145, 182 N.W. 673; 16 A. L. R. 910, and
we quote from the opinion as follows:

'' * * * The trial court limited consideration of the
proof that defendant was engaged in unlawful transportation of liquor to the question of whether or not
his criminal conduct in that particular so affected his
mind as to stimulate or induce wanton negligence in
recklessly driving the car as claimed, thereby showing
its causal connection with the killing.
9
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.. ''On that subject the court charged the jury as follqws: 'I have already charged you that defendant, if
·found guilty, must be found guilty of gross and culpable
,;, ·negligence in striking and killing Miss Cusino, and
·· ·. that such gross and culpable negligence in driving and
· . managing .his automobile was the proximate cause of
.., ·"•tlY,!i~.s (:usino' s death ... Gentlemen of the jury, thert
· . · ,'has· been some testimony introduced here in reference
· · to th'e defendant's automobile containing whisky. That
testimony was admitted, not for the purpose of proving
·, the guilt of the defendant on .the charge here made
.. ~ ;;--.. f&ainst. him,. but was introduced as bearing upon the
· · . _question of negligence. If the defendant knowingly had
~· "-'. ,"lln his automobile a quantity of liquor which he was
transporting from Toledo, Ohio, to Detroit, Michigan,
. .he would be guilty of a felony under the laws of Michi- .
. ' :. ,1: gan, and he would also be guilty of an offense under the
' ·laws of the United States. And while the fact, if you find
:u it :to bf= a fact, that he had whisky in his automobile is no
· ,..;>ev~qenc_e of his guilt, and is not to be considered in
. : · . . this light, yet you may consider it as bearing upon his
~- · negligence. It is the theory of the prosecution that
the .defendant was violating the statute referred to
a,..nd transporting liquor illegally, and was hurrying
: •\ ·.! _,n, tqrough tl;le county of Monroe with his illegal load of
1
· ·· ...·:· liquor. This theory of the prosecution must also be
· · proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before
.1:, the jury can consider the carrying of the liquor as
having had anything to do ·with the accident. In any
event, and even though the defendant w'as knowingly
; .. carrying the liquor, he must be found to have driven
, , . 1: :his machine at the place of the accident with gross and
· ..
culpable neglect, and that the accident occurred from
. such gross and cupa~le neglect.'
"Under the circumstances of this case proof that
defendant was engaged in perpetrating a criminal act
with the very agency by which he caused the accidental
death was competent for the purpose to which the
• ·j''( ·

'•
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court carefully limited it in a very plain and fair charge,
fully protecting the rights of the accused.
"The conviction and judgment of sentence will
stand affirmed."
This cited case demonstrates that there are unlawful acts which,
though they may seem to be far afield, do have some causal
connection with the death of the victim.
There is evidence in this case that the defendant was arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor on June 8, 1947, and that his license, as a result, was subsequently revoked. The law provides that it shall be unlawful
for anyone to drive a vehicle on the public highways while his
license is revoked. 57-4-32 Utah Code Annotated 1943. Section
57-4-24 id. provides that one year after revocation an applicant
may apply for a new license, but that the department shall not
grant it until after an investigation of the character, abilities
and habits of the driver indicates that it is safe for him to drive
on the highways. It is plain that the legislature felt that for at
least a year after revocation, a driver is not safe on the highways,
at least, there would be a presumption to that effect. Therefore,
to drive on the highway within that year is prima facie unsafe,
reckless and in marked disregard for the safety of others. Surely
there is no question but what unsafe driving has a causal connection to an accident occurring as a result of that driving.
Driving after having had one's license revoked then, so far as
this argument is concerned, is not comparable to the driving of
a person who is not supporting his wife and family or who is
carrying concealed weapons or who is driving without registra11
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tion plates. Respondent contends that such an act is not only
malum prohibitum but is also malum in se, just as is driving
· while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. And, under
the decision of the Lingman case, it is not necessary that recklessness or a marked disregard for the safety of others be shown.
Acts which are malum in se might be said to be in and of themselves reckless and in marked disregard for the safety of others.
Feeling that t~ere is no particular difference between civil
and criminal cases on this question, respondent cites the case of
Parks vs. :Pere Marquette Ry. Co (1946) 23 N.W. (2d) 196;
315 Mich. 38, in which case the deceased was killed in his own
automobile by a collision with the defendant's train. The decedent's friend who was driving, had no operator's license. In
a suit by the administrator against the defendant railroad, the
lower court found against the administrator because of the
contrib~tory negligence of the driver. The appellate court upheld the trial court in refusing to instruct the jury that the fact
· the driver had no license was immaterial. On this point the
court said:
"As bearing upon the question of contributory negligence, it was competent to disclose to the jury that the
driver of decedent's automobile did not have a license
since an unlicet;tsed driver operating an automobile
upon the highways of this state does so in direct violation of the statute. * * *
"The statute · requiring chauffeurs to be licensed
was designed to protect the public against incompetent
operators of cars and the employment of an unlicensed
chauffeur has, therefore, a bearing upon the exercise
of care which the defendant owed toward the plaintiH
in the operation of its car * * * *
"It is not an immaterial question like the failure to
12
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have a car licensed, which can have no possible bearing
upon the operation of the car. The violation of the
ordinance, therefore, is prima facie evidence of the
negligence to be submitted to the jury in connection
with the other facts in the case to determine the ultimate liability * * * *."
Respondent submits that we have here a much stronger case
than that of the driving without a license. In the case at bar
the driver's license had been revoked for the reason that he was
not a safe driver. Nevertheless he drove his truck against the
compunction of the law, which makes it a misdemeanor for so
doing. Respondent has no quarrel with appellant on the necessity of instructing the jury pertaining to proximate cause. But
respondent takes the position that such requirement does not
prohibit the introduction of evidence pertaining to facts and
circumstances which might be found to have some causal (Onnection with the ultimate result. Appellant cited several cases
in his brief as illustrative of the rule that an unlawful act to be
the basis of the crime of involuntary manslaughter must be the
direct and proxfmate cause of the death of the deceased. It is
interesting to note that in none of these cases is the decision
based upon the improper admission of any incompetent evidence
pertaining to unlawful acts charged as the basis of the crime of
. involuntary manslaughter. Most of them pertain to the question of whether or not the Judges' instructions were correct.
ASSERTION NO. 2
THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE ON
THE I~SUE OF DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATED CONDITION AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED CRIME.
The prohibition against driving while under the influence
13
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of intoxicating liquor is for the purpose of making our highways
safe. In fact the Legislature says that it is not safe to drive
while in such condition. Anyone who does so, therefore, drive
in marked disregard for the safety of others. This court has
recently passed upon the question of whether or not causal connection must be directly shown in cases of involuntary manslaughter as· the result of intoxication. State vs. Busby, 102
Utah 416, 131 Pac. 2d 510. The facts of that case are very
similar to this case. There the deceased, a pedestrian, was
struck at a crossing in Salt Lake City. A witness testified that
he saw the defendant driving the car which struck the deceased,
that he took the license number, followed the car, drove up
alongside, called to the defendant and told him he had hit a
man; whereupon the defenda~t grunted and drove on. There
was considerable evidence of the defendant's having been drinking prior to the accident as well as to his intoxicated condition
subsequent thereto. The defendant in attempt~ng to avoid responsibility for the death of the deceased, set up an alibi as his
defense. In affirming a conviction of involuntary manslaughter,
the court uses the following language:
"Defendant contends ( 1) That the court erred in
admiting in evidence testimony of defendant's intoxi. cated condition forty-five minutes after the accident
and ( 2) .: that whether such testimony is admitted or
not there is no evidence that the defendant was intoxi- '
cated at the tim·e of the accident and ·( 3) that even
though there was such evidence and such is criminal
negligence within the tests laid down by State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P 2d 457, there is no evidence
that such criminal negligence caused the accident.
"As to the first proposition, defendant testified that
14
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during the afternoon he had b~en drinking beer; that
he had his last beer about 8 o'clock, aq.d dran~ :nothing
after that time. The court admitted evidence· that at
9:15 p.m., and for some hours thereafter defendant
was drunk. The accident occurred at 8:30p.m., a half
hour after his last drink. On the record the ·admission
of the evidence cannot be error. Where a man has been
drinking off and on from 3 to 8 p.m., and is drunk at
9:15 p.m., the jury might, in the light of the evidence
of his conduct currently with the accident, well consider those facts and find therefrom that at 8: 30 the
liquor had so far taken effect that the drinker was so
under its influence as to be impaired in· his faculties
and reactions. In this case, the. defendant's .apparent
unawareness that he hit a man and his unintelligible
answer when his attention was called to it within a few
moments after the accident, viewed in the light of the
testimony that he had been drinking before the accident,
are all circumstances from which the jury could conclude that he was intxoicated to the extent that his
faculties for keeping a lookout and for control were
appreciably impaired.
"There was sufficient basis in fact for the inference
that Busby was in an intoxicated condition a't rhe time
he struck the decedent; there is not qnly a sufficient
basis for the inference that he was so intoxicated that
the control of his car was appreciably affected by it
but a basis for the inference that he was so drunk that
he did not know that he had struck the decedent or,
knowing it, he had endeavored to escape by leaving the
scene of the accident. If the jury accepted the latter, it
would find a guilty knowledge which would itself be
the basis for a conclusion, in connection with evidence
that defendant was criminally negligent, that such
negligence caused the accident. If the jury concluded
that the defendant was in such condition that he dicl
not know he had hit the decedent it is contended that
15
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the accident might nevertheless have been caused solely
by the negligence of the decedent. Even if. the decedent
was guilty of contributory negligence, if the defendant
was guilty of criminal negligence as defined in the
case of State v. Lingman, supra, and such negligence
caused or contributed to the death, the fact that the
decedent himself may have been guilty of negligence
which also contributed, would not excuse the defendant.
The evidence is sufficient to justify a conclusion of
criminal negligence as defined in the case of State v.
Lingman, supra. This being the case the jury was
in the position of having to be satisfied that the negligence of the defendant contributed to the accident. No
witness saw just how the accident happened. The
witnesses in the car which followed Busby saw the
decedent's hat fly off and later the body drop to the
pavement but did not see the actual impact between
the car and the decedent's body nor the conduct of
the decedent immediately before the impact. The
evidence was sufficient for the inference that the front
of defendant's car struck the deceased. The glasses,
presumably those of the decedent, were found on the
crosswalk; hence the jury could have placed the deceddent on the crosswalk when he was struck. There is
a duty on the part of the driver to keep a lookout
for pedestrians on the crosswalk even though such
driver may have a green light. State v. Adamson, Utah,
125 P. 2d 429. There is a presumption of fact which
is already a part of our common law, that a person
acts for his own safety. To repeat: THE JURY
COULD INFER FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF LIQUOR AT THE TIME OF THE IMPACT. IT
COULD FURTHER INFER PROM HIS CONDUCT
THAT HE l¥7 AS SO BADLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR THAT DRIVING IN THAT
CONDITION-----WAS ITSELF A LACK OF DUE
16
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REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OtHERS AND
THAT HE W41S, THEREFORE, GUILTY OF CR/11'1INAL NEGLIGENCE. So it could conclude from the
presumption that a man acts 1 for his own safety, that
the decedent did not step or jump in front of the car.
This presumption should at least serve the purpose of
warding off the effect of a legal situation in which a
conjecture that the cause of the accident was the negligence of decedent, is equally balanced with a conjecture
that such negligence, if it existed, was not a cause
of the accident if indeed under the circumstances of
this case we can say that without such presumption
the mind could be in equipoise in that manner. Thm
the presumption that a man acts with regard to his own
safety having performed the office of negating the conjecture that the decedent himself was the cause of the
accident, the only other deduction is that it was caused
by the defendant AND IF CAUSED THROUGH HIS
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE U7HlCH AS WE HAVE
SEEN COULD BE INFERRED, the jury could find him
guilty. If a man so blind as· not to be ~ble to sec
pedestrians on the croswalk kills one, are we Jo say
that the jury cannot infer that defendant's condition
was the cause of the accident because the jury ·would
have to speculate that the deceased may have negligently
stepped in front of the car? The above conclusion
follows from a finding that the defendant failed to see
the pedestrian and was unaware that he had. hit him,
a fact situation from which, with the evidence of drinking and intoxication, it could be inferred that defendant
drove with a marked disregard for the safety of others.

"If, on the other hand, the jury concluded tha-t defendant did see the deceased but that he failed to stop
and pick him up, it could infer from that a guilty
knowledge that his own negligence had caused· the
accident. It is contended that his going on if he knev.'
he had hit the deceased is equally compatibhi \vith ·a
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feeling of fright even though he knew he had not
caused the accident. But every reasonable hypothcs._
consistent with innocence does not require that we construe a man's illegal act of fleeing from the scene of the
accident as a neutral factor in disclosing his guilty
knowledge or the absence of it. People v. Newland,
15 Cal. 2d 678, 104 P 2d 778; People v. Robinson, 49
Cal. App. 2d 576, 122 P 2d 77. Public policy demands
that a proper balance be struck between the protection
which the law throws about an accused and the protection which the law attempts to afford society from
the results of criminal conduct. WE THINK A BASIS
WAS LAID IN THE EVIDENCE FOR AN INFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE JURY THAT NOT
ONLY WAS BUSBY CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT
IN DRIVING HIS CAR WHILE UNDER THE
TELLING INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR BUT THAT
SUCH NEGLIGENCE AT LEAST CONTRIBUTED
TO THE ACCIDENT AS TO JUSTIFY A VERDICT
OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
The
judgment as affirmed."
It is submitted that we have very nearly the same situation in
this case and that there was no error in admitting evidence of
the defendant's intoxicated condition.
In the case of State vs. Palmer ( 1929) 147 S. E. 817; 197
N. C. 135; the court in holding that there had been no error on
the part of the lower court in refusing to dismiss the involuntary
manslaughter charge against the defendant who was driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as well as violating other traffic laws, discusses the rule that responsibility for
the death depends upon whether or not the unlawful act is
malum in se or malum prohibitum. We quote from the court's

opinion:
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"It is, however, practically agreed, without regard
to this distinction, that if the act is a violation of a
statute intended and designed to prevent injury to the
person, and is in itself dangerous and death ensues, the
person violating the statute is guilty of manslaughter
at least, and under some circumstances, of murder."
In a case singularly similar to the case at bar because parts
of two teeth from decedent's mouth were discovered between
the hood and fender of the defendant's automobile, the court in
its opinion supports the theory that driving while_ tmder the influence of intoxicating liquor is culpable negligence. It is the
case of State vs. Kline, ( 1926) 168 Minn. 263, 209 N.W. 881.
The following is a quotation from the court's opinion:

"The first contention is that the evidence does nor
support the conviction. It is said the state- produced no
eyewitness of the tragedy; no one who saw how defendant was driving at the moment of the impact; negligence
is never presumed; this may have been an unavoidable
accident; or may have been due to the negligence of
Stodola; and it was for the state to negative accidental
injury and negligence of the victim. These contentions
are fallacious. The state had no greater burden than
to prove beyond· a reasonable doubt that defendant
was culpably negligent in driving his automobile against
Stodola so as to cause his death. When that is done
any other cause of the homicide is negatived. Negligence of the victim would not be a defense.. State v.
Peterson, 153 Minn. 310, 190 N. W. 345. We do
not mean to hold that, if the defense to the homicide
was unavoidable accident, negligence of the victim
might not be shown. But no such issue or defense was .
raised by the evidence. There can be no doubt of the
sufficiency of the proof. Defendant was drunk. The
law makes it a .crime for a person in that condition
to drive a car. The law also makes it the duty of the
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driver of a car at night to have it lit so that objec ..s
in front upon the highway may be seen, and dehncj
how pedestrians should be warned and safeguarded.
Defendant either was so drunk that he could not see;
or, if he saw, had not the ability to give warnmg 01
to avoid striking Stodola. There is evidence uor1;
which the jury could find that Stodola was walk111L_:
west, north of the center line of the road, as defendarh
was coming east, driving south of the center line, anJ
that within a few feet of Stodola defendant swerved
abruptly to the north of the center line, striking hi.L.
down with the front front light and fender of the
automobile, and dragging him some 20 feet easterly.
"Next it is asserted that it was error to charge that
to drive an automobile when intoxicated is a statutory
offense, and that a violation of that law raises a presumption of negligence. Of course, as stated in State
v. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 175 N.W. 892, violation
of a statutory provision regarding the operation oi
motor vehicles, such as found in sections 2705-2714,
G.S. 1923, does not prove the exi'stence of culpable
negligence within the meaning of section 10078, G.S.
1923, defining the crime for which defendant was tried
But a violation of a statute intended for the protection
of another, which proximately causes or results in
injury to such other, must be held criminal negligence.
And surely no one can read this record without comin,r;
to the conclusion that defendant's intoxication was
the cause of the reckless manner in which the automobile was driven over Stodola. * * *
"Common sense, in the absence of any statute on the
subject, suggests that for an intoxicated person tn
undertake to drive an automobile on a much traveled
highway is gross or culpable negligence. And, if
such negligence is shown to result in so driving as to
str~ke down and kill a person traveling in the proper
20
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place upon the highway, there should be no difficulty
in finding t~at the driver's culpable negligence caused
the homicide."
The question of whether or not evidence of intoxication
was properly admitted was raised in Jones vs. Commonwealth,
(1938) 273 Ky. 444, ~16 S. W. (2d) 984, and at page 987
of 116 S.W. (2d) the court includes the following in its opinion:
"Certainly, there was no error in allowing the witness to tell the jury of his finding the empty jug, which
·smelled of liquor, in appellant's car.
As argued by appellee, the matter of drinking is
necessarily an ingredient of recklessness, and this evidence bore upon the Commonwealth's effort to here
show that the driver of the car, charged with reckless
and wanton driving, was at the time intoxicated.
The evidence submitted was therefore both material
and substantial as bearing on the question of whether
or not the drinking induced and brought. about appellant's charged reckless and wanton driving."
Also, in the case of People vs. Townsend, (1921) 214
Mich. 267, 183 N. W. 177, 16 A. L. R. 902, the court held
that it was not necessary to set out in the information the
specific acts which immediately brought about the death of the
deceased because the act of driving while intoxicated was
malum in se. \Y/ e quote from the court's opinion on page
905 of 16 A. L. R.:
"Voluntary intoxication is an offense not only malum
prohibitum, but malum in se., condemned as wrong
in and of itself by very sense of common decency and
good morals from the time that Noah in his drunkenness brought shame to his sons so that they backed
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in to cover his nakedness, and Lot's daughters employed
it for incestuous purposes. Drunkenness was declared
wrong in and of itself, and punishment provided by
the Israelites; by the ancient Chinese in an imperial
edict about the year 1120 B. C., called "The Announcement About Drunkenness;'' in ancient India by the
ordinances of Manu. In Rome the censors turned
drunken members out of the Senate and branded them
with infamy. In England 300 years ago drunkenness
was pilloried as the root and foundation of many sins,
such as bloodshed, stabbing, murder, swearing, and
such like, by the statute, 4 Jac. I. chap. 5, and the Ecclesiastical judges and officers were granted power tc
~ensure and punish offenders, and Bacon, in his Abridgment of the Common Law, lists drunkenness as one
of the sins of heresy. In- Massachusetts Bay Colony in
1633-34 one Robte Coles, for drunkenness, was disfranchised and sentenced to wear a red letter D upon
a white background for a year. One of the acts passed
at the first session of the General Assembly of the
Northwest Territory and approved December 2, 1779,
provided a penalty for being drunk in a public highway. Our statute Comp. Laws 1915 Sec 7774, declares
drunkards to be disorderly persons, . and Sec. 15 530
makes it an offense for any person to be drunk or intoxicated in any street or highway.
"Voluntary drunkenness in a public place was always
a misdemeanor at common law; and it was always
wrong morally and legally. It is malum in se. State
v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac. 259, 8 Am. Crim. Rep.
165.
"It is gross and culpable negligence for a drunken
man to guide and operate an automobile upon a public
highway, and one doing so and occasioning injuries
to another, causing death, is guilty of manslaughter.
It was unlawful for defendant to operate his auto-
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mobile upon the public highway while he was intoxicated; made unlawful by statute, and wrongin and of
itself, and it was criminal carelessness to do so, and
he is guilty of manslaughter, provided the death 01
Agnes Thorne was a proximate result of his unlawful
act .

***".

.

j\mong other involuntary manslaughter cases relegating
the question of proximate cause as unimportant wherethe driver
of the automobile is under the influence of intoxicating liquor
is the case of Keller vs. State ( 1927} 155 Ten~. 633;·:299 S. W.
803;.59 A. L. R. 685, which was cited by the appellant in his
brief. The plaintiff in error was charged with driving an automobile while under the influence of an intox:icant apd running
over the deceased thereupon causing his death. There was a
verdict of involuntary manslaughter and the plaintiff in error
appealed, raising the question of the sufficiency of the evidence,
and more particularly' whether or not his intoxicated condition
was a cause or occasion of the decedent's death. In affirming
the conviction, the court said:
"We are of opinion that the. driving of · a:n . automobile upon the public highways of the state by one
'who is under the influence of an intoxicant,' as the
quoted words are interpreted in Bostwick v. State~
supra, is an unlawful act malum in se. ·. An automo~ile
in the hands of a sober and skillful driver upon the·
highway, operated according to law, is an instrumentality fraught with danger to others, and ·careful
handling of such an instrumentality is essential to th~
public safety. It is highly criminal and perilous to
life and property for those under the influence of an
intoxicant to such an extent 'as to deprive them of their
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sense of discretion,' to undertake to run such a mach.ine
on the thoroughfares.
Such being our view of the matter, we think the
policy of the law forbids an investigation as to probabL
consequences, when the driver of an automobile 'under
the influence of an intoxicant,' as heretofore defined
runs his car over another person and kills him on the
public highways of the state. There are many things
that sober man, in the exercise of due care, would d,,
to avoid such a collision, which would be entirely
beyond an intoxicated driver. Fatalities are too numerous and conditions too serious to permit speculative
inquiries in a case like the one before us.
There is nothing radical or novel in this conclusion. The efficient cause of this accident was the
bperation of this car by plaintiff in error while under
the influence of an intoxicant. Matters urged by way
of defense merely amount to a charge of contributory
negligence on the part of deceased and the rule of
contributory negligence does not apply in criminal
cases. Lauterbach v. State, 132 Tenn. 603, 179 S.
w. 130."
See also: Whitman vs. State ( 1929) 97 Fla. 988; 122 So.
567; People vs. Kelly ( 1925) 70 Cal. App. 519, 234 Pac. 110;
State vs. Monteith (1933) 53 Ida. 30; 20 Pac. (2d) 1023; State
vs. Williams (1931) 161 Miss. 406; 137 So. 106; and 99 A.
L. R. 785, 6 and 7.
Appellant argues that there is not sufficent evidence to
establish that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
at the time of the alleged crime. It is submitted that there was
sufficient evidence to go to the jury on that question and that it
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was not necessary that the defendant be in a stupefied and
drunken condition but that it was sufficient ·to show merely
that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to any
extent. Chapman vs. State ( 1930) 40 Ga. App. 725; 151 S. E.
410, supports this proposition and holds that:
"It is· not necessary for the state to show that the accused was drunk; but it is sufficient if .the state show:·
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was under
the influence of some intoxicant as charged to any ex
tent whatsoever, whether drunk or not."
ASSERTION NO. 3
THE COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED DEFEND... ,
. ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION AND
CORRECTLY _REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO .. ,.•.
RETURN A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY.
Appellant's argument as set forth in his Proposition No.
3, is based upon his premise that the evidence introduced per- .
taining to the revocation of defendant's driver's license and his
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was
incompetent and, therefore, there was not sufficient evidence to
go to the jury. Upon the argument set forth above in Assertion
No. 2, Tesponderit submits that the evidence was competent and
was sufficient to go to the jury.
ASSERTION NO. 4
THE:COURT PROPERLY AND CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF IN2'5
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VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND THE LAW PERTAINING THERETO.

We submit that respondent's argument in answer to appellant's propositions 1 and 2 sufficiently establishes that the
court's instructions on driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor and on driving when one's license has been
revoked, were correct. Appellant admits at page 62 of his brief
that Instructions 8 and 10 included the necessary "proximate
cause" requirement.
In using the word "or" in place of the word "and" in the
instructions pertaining to driving recklessly or in marked disregard for the safety of deceased, the court was absolutely
proper, for that is the law. The very much cited Lingman case
uses the same words in setting forth the law pertaining to criminal negligence and, as a matter of fact, that portion of the
Lingman ·opinion quoted by the appellant in his brief, contains
the definition of criminal negligence three times, and in all
three definitions the word "or" is used. See appellant's brief
page 50, line 24, page 53, line 4 and page 55, line 25.
Appellant contends that Instruction N_o. 15 was ambiguous
and misleading insofar as it refers to the defendant's running
into or against the deceased without qualifying such act as
being done with criminal negligence. It is submitted that such
does not constitute error for the reason that further on in the
same Instruction No. 15, and also in Instructions 3 and 4, the
jury is adequately directed that they must find beyond a reason26
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able doubt, that the defedant ran into or against the deceased in
a criminally, negligent manner.

CONCLUSION
A review of the law and authorities pertaining to the. admission of evidence and the elements of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter, and a review of the record reveals that the appellant was granted a fair, legal trial; that prejudicial errors did
not occur; that there was sufficient competent evidence to go to
the jury and that the jury was properly instructed in accordance
• with law and justice.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General

ROBERT S. RICHARDS,
Assistant Attorney General.

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT.
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